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PATERNITY BLOOD GROUPING TESTS:
RECENT SETBACKS*
Sidney B. Schatkint
In 1901 Dr. Karl Landsteiner of the
Rockefeller Institute reported the dis-
covery of the four blood groups, A, B,
AB, and 0. Since then more than 5,000
articles and many monographs and
books have been published upon the
subject, and the forensic application of
blood grouping tests-as legal evidence
in court to prove non-paternity-is now
firmly established in many jurisdic-
tions. Blood grouping tests have been
used in many European countries since
1920 with a substantial percentage of
exclusions-that is, instances, when the
results of tests made on the child, the
mother, and the alleged father indi-
cated that the latter was wrongfully
accused. For instance, in Denmark
alone during 1933-1936, there were 775
exclusions of paternity in 3124 cases,
nearly 25 per cent.'
European medical authorities regard
the blood test as the most valuable
method available toward the solution
of the perplexing problem of deciding
paternity disputes. The legal value of
the evidence afforded by this test is
acknowledged because it is based on
facts scientifically and objectively estab-
* Although the author is in charge of pater-
nity proceedings for the Office of the Corpora-
tion Counsel, New York City, this article repre-
sents only his personal views and does not
necessarily reflect the views of the Corpora-
tion Counsel's Office.
t Assistant Coiporation Counsel, New York
City.
1 Wiener, A. S., Blood Groups and Blood
Transfusions, (2d ed., 1939) 265.
lished. Up to 1933, 8000 tests had been
performed for European courts and
with highly satisfactory results; yet it
was not until 1935 that the first Ameri-
can legislation upon the subject was en-
acted in the State of New York. Thus
far only four other states have enacted
similar legislation: Wisconsin, Maine,
Ohio, and New Jersey.
In Pennsylvania (which lacks a spe-
cific statute) some courts have granted
blood grouping tests, and accepted the
results thereof,2 and others have refused
them.- Blood grouping test results have
been admitted as evidence in a Cali-
fornia case, but the jury's disregard of
the evidence which established the in-
nocence of the alleged father was sus-
tained by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia.4 In the District of Columbia,
although there is no specific authority
for blood grouping tests, a test was
ordered under a rule of practice pro-
viding for physical examination of a
party litigant.5
In the past few years, decisions have
been handed down in four states which
call for some comment. In three of
these decisions the court disregarded
21Blood test granted: Commonwealth v.
Zammorelli, 17 Pa. D. & C. 229 (1931); Common-
wealth v. Visocki, 23 Pa. D. & C. 103 (1936).
xBlood test denied: Commonwealth v. Mor-
ris, 22 Pa. D. & C. Mll (1934); Commonwealth V.
English, 123 Pa. Super. 161, 186 AtL 298, 301
(1936).
4Arias v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal. 2d, 428, 74
P. 2d, 1043 (1937).
4 Beach v. Beach, 114 F. 2d, 479 (1940).
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the expert's finding on non-paternity,
and in the fourth the court refused to
order the test, although there was a
specific statute upon the subject. It
may prove interesting to examine the
court's reasoning in each one of these
cases.
In Harding v, Harding," a support
proceeding involving a dispute as to
the paternity of the wife's child, blood
grouping tests excluded the husband
as a possible father. Nevertheless, the
court disregarded the test results and
held the respondent liable for the
child's support. In the light of the ex-
clusion the facts in the case are signifi-
cant. The wife admitted having had
antenuptial relations with her husband,
and he married her on being informed
of her pregnant condition. The child,
therefore, although concededly legiti-
mate and born in wedlock, was never-
theless conceived out of lawful wed-
lock. What warrant did the court have
for assuming the wife was telling the
truth, in the face of the blood grouping
test exclusion? The court reasoned as
follows: "Feminine dignity throughout
all generations and races eternally alert
and vigilant to resent the infamy of
such a charge (that her child is illegiti-
mate) and outraged at being thus de-
graded by a test of its decency and
morality by a court order (for a blood
test) issued without any evidence in
the first instance to sustain it, never
forgives or forgets this deadly insult."
This line of reasoning does not cancel
the concrete, objective evidence of non-
paternity afforded by the blood test.
Nor is it cancelled by the court's state-
8 22 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 810 (1940).
ment that the function of the Domestic
Relations Court is "the reconstruction
of families, the quieting of domestic dis-
cord, the reuniting of broken homes,
the healing of marital wounds, and the
restoration of the dignity of the family."
The court in the foregoing case also
invoked the rule of presumption of
legitimacy of a child born in wedlock.
It is today well known, however, that
such a presumption is subject to re-
buttal. The evidence of illegitimacy,
gathered impersonally and objectively
in a laboratory, constitutes proof of the
highest order and should be welcomed
by the courts, and the presumption of
legitimacy should give way when in
conflict with the actual fact of illegiti-
macy afforded by a conclusive blood
test result.
A further reason given for the court's
decision in the Harding case appears in
the following excerpt from the opinion:
"The language (of the blood test
statute) by implication substitutes the
medical expert for the court as the de-
terminer of the fact of 'exclusion'. This
implication is drawn from these words
'the result of such tests may be received
in evidence but only in cases where
definite exclusion is established'. Ac-
cording to this language the 'exclusion'
as to paternity is already determined
before the facts establishing the exclu-
sion are submitted in evidence."
The italicized portion of the foregoing
excerpt was the subject of an amend-
ment to the New York Statute on May
4, 1936, designed to protect the de-
fendant against the erroneous impres-
sion that might be created by an incon-
clusive blood test result. "The amend-
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ment... modified the provisions there-
of to bring them into accord with the
most modem scientific practice. Med-
ical experimentation has reached the
point where the exclusion of a given
person as the parent of a child can be
determined with scientific certainty;
but blood grouping tests are purely
negative in efficacy and cannot, at the
present time, establish paternity as a
positive fact."17 Thus, the test will not
be granted upon the mother's request
because, clearly, the result cannot prove
paternity.'
In a recent New Jersey case, Bed-
narik v. Bednarik,9 a husband sought
a divorce from his wife, claiming that
the child was not his own and alleging
his wife's adultery. His motion for a
blood test was denied on constitutional
grounds. The court said: "To subject a
person against his will to a blood test
is an assault and battery, and clearly
an invasion of his personal privacy. It
involves the sticking of a surgical
needle into hfs body. Perhaps the oper-
ation is harmless in the great majority
of cases, although the risk of infection
is always present. But if we admit such
encroachment upon the personal im-
munity of an individual where in prin-
ciple can we stop? Suppose medical
discovery in the future evolves a tech-
nique whereby the truth may infallibly
be secured from a witness by trepan-
ning his skull and testing the functions
of the brain beneath. No one would
contend that the witness could be
forced against his will to undergo such
7Spellman, Criminal Codes, Inferior Crim-
inal Courts Act, Annotation to Section 67, 1002.
sFlippen v. Meinhold, 156 Misc. 451, 282
N. Y. Supp. 444 (1935).
916 AUt. (2d) 80 (N. J., 1940).
a major operation at the imminent risk
of his life, in order to secure evidence
in a suit between private parties. How
then can he be forced to undergo a less
dangerous operation, and at what point
shall the line be drawn? To my mind,
it is not the degree of risk to life,
health, or happiness which is the de-
terminative factor, but the fact of the
invasion of the constitutional right to
personal privacy."
An interesting article on blood tests,
with particular emphasis on the legal
question whether a person can be com-
pelled to furnish the necessary drop of
blood, was published in 1926 and is well
worth reading today. 0 The author of
that article cites examples of drastic
remedies in the courts (jailing a ma-
terial witness; physical examination in
a personal injury action; if paralysis is
claimed, a test of sensitiveness to pain;
exhibition of wound or disfigurement
to the jury) and then asks, "Are these
not the same courts which once ordered
people to trial by ordeal and trial by
battle? Has a drop of blood grown too
great for them?"
In the Bednarik case the court in-
quired: "Upon what social theory can
the compulsory blood grouping test of
a defendant and her child in a divorce
suit ordered for the purpose of attempt-
ing to prove her guilty of adultery, be
justified?" The answer, it seems, is
obvious. The court wants the truth.
Without the truth, it cannot render a
correct decision. As the court put it in
State v. Damm,"1 "The primary func-
1o Lee, B., "9Blood Tests for Paternity,"
Amer. Bar Assn. Journal 12: July 441 (1926).
1i 62 S. D. 123, 252 N. W. 7 (1933), 266 N. W.
677 (1936).
PATERNITY BLOOD GROUPING TESTS
tion of the judiciary is the administra-
tion of justice, and justice can never be
7ightly administered unless truth be
first ascertained as nearly as may be.
5 * * We perceive no valid reason why
qourts of record may not require of any
person within their jurisdiction the fur-
4ishing of a few drops of blood for test
purposes when, in the opinion of the
court, so to do will or may materially
pssist in administering justice in a pend-
ing matter."
In the Bednarik case the court gave
po indication that it considered the
lood test unreliable. To the contrary,
it cited various decisions upholding the
reliability of the test. In fact, the par-
ties stipulated as to the validity and
ovidential value of the blood test. A
ponsiderable portion of the opinion is
Olevoted to a discussion of the constitu-
tional immunity against self-incrimina-
tion. On the other hand, a distinction
has been drawn between real evidence
(such as a physical examination) and
testimonial evidence, and the former
kind has been held not to violate the
immunity provision. The court con-
ceded it a debatable question whether
a compulsory blood test violates the
constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination, but, nevertheless, it was
denied as an unconstitutional invasion
of the.right of personal privacy of the
wife and child.
-In a paternity proceeding, State v.
Wright, tried before the Court of Com-
mon Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio, a
pathologist's report of an absolute ex-
clusion of paternity was admitted in
evidence, but the jury found the de-
fendant guilty. A motion for a new
trial upon the ground that the verdict
was against the weight of evidence was
granted, and from this decision the
State appealed. Upon appeal, it was
urged (1) that the trial court abused
its discretion in setting aside the ver-
dict of the jury and in granting a new
trial; (2) that the court erred in ad-
mitting the blood test evidence of non-
paternity; and (3) that the court erred
in permitting the pathologist to give
her opinion that the defendant was not
the father of the child, that being an
ultimate fact to be determined by the
jury.
The appellate court disposed of the
State's contentions (2) and (3) by
noting that even if the admission of
that evidence were error, it was not
prejudicial, for the jury found in favor
of the State, and that for any error to
be the basis of reversal it must be a
prejudicial one. On the merits of the
question, however, the court found
there was no error in admitting this
evidence, saying: "We think that it
was proper to introduce the testimony
(of non-paternity by the blood test)
under such safeguards as should al-
ways surround the testimony of an ex-
pert witness, and we are of the opinion
that those were present in this case.
The testimony complained of, as to the
expression of the opinion by the expert
to the effect that the accused could not
be the father of the child, is not in our
opinion .such as is obnoxious to the
rule."
After citing Commonwealth v. Zam-
marelli,12 wherein the jury's verdict of
guilty in disregard of the exclusion of
12 op. cit supra note 2.
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paternity was reversed on appeal, the
court said: "If the tests capable of being
made are so accurate, as testified to by
the expert, that it is possible by the
process of exclusion to protect a man
who is innocent of the charge, it will
be a most valuable assistance in cases
of this kind."
In upholding the trial court's decision
in granting a new trial on the ground
that the jury's verdict was against the
weight of the evidence, the appellate
court stated: "With the view we have
of the competency of the evidence as to
the blood test, we are not prepared to
say that the court was wrong in set-
ting aside the verdict."
In Arias v. Kalensnikoff,13 a paternity
proceeding in California, despite the re-
sults of blood grouping tests establish-
ing non-paternity, the defendant was
adjudged the father of the child. A ver-
dict was entered against the defendant
even though the evidence in his behalf
showed that (1) the complainant was
twice married; (2) she named another
man in the birth certificate as the
father of the child; and (3) the de-
fendant was 70 years of age, and ac-
cording to his wife, impotent for a num-
ber of years.
Although there was no specific stat-
ute in California, the District Court of
Appeal took judicial notice of the blood
test as an established scientific fact and
reversed the conviction, saying: "We
are not required to believe what physi-
cal facts demonstrate to be untrue or
that" which is contrary to immutable
physical laws .... Hence a finding of
13 Op. cit supra note 4.
14Assembly Bill No. 2216 authorizing the
use of blood tests was passed by the Assembly
fact based solely upon testimony of a
witness contrary to a scientific fact will
be set aside by this court on appeal as
not supported by substantial evidence."
That court included in its opinion a
recommendation that the California
legislature enact a specific statute al-
lowing the test, similar to those in New
York and Wisconsin.14 Subsequently,
however, the original judgment of con-
viction was affirmed by the Supreme
Court upon the ground that the expert's
report was not conclusive but was to
be considered together with all the
other facts, which constituted "ample
evidence to support the finding of pa-
rentage."
In State ex rel. Slovak v. Holod an
Ohio appellate court affirmed a judg-
ment of filiation, although the blood test
showed the defendant could not have
been the father of the child. In hold-
ing that blood test evidence of non-
paternity is not conclusive but should
be considered along with all the other
evidence, the court raised the following
points:
(1) An exception has been found to
the laws of inheritance.
(2) Will the blood of "bleeders" or
hemophiliacs, such as members of the
family of the deposed King of Spain,
react to the test in the same uniform-
ity?
(3) Will the blood of human hybrids
so react?
(4) Professor Einstein's mathemati-
cal calculations have conclusively
established the incorrectness of New-
ton's Theory that objects fall in straight
on May 21, 1937, and the Senate on May 28,
1937, but was pocket-vetoed by the Governor.
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lines. Therefore, there fell by the way-
side one of those laws of Nature long
held immutable, which courts perhaps
have judicially noticed and applied as
conclusive.
(5) It (the blood test) may brand
many honest women, who have com-
mitted one indiscretion, with promiscu-
ity. and as liars.
In his recent article, which appeared
in this Journal,"" Dr. Alexander S.
Wiener, who has done considerable
work in this field, had occasion to re-
ply to the above points in the Holod
case.
The single exception referred to by
the court is quoted from a report of the
American Medical Association's Com-
mittee on Medicolegal Blood Grouping
Tests (of which Dr. Wiener was a
member). This exception was the only
one among 25,000 individuals tested.
Assuming, says Dr. Wiener, that this
was a real exception, the possibility of
error is in the proportion 6f 1 in 25,000.
Dr. Wiener points out that the phe-
nomenon occurring in the blood of
hemophiliacs, wherein their blood does
not coagulate normally, bears no rela-
tion to the reactions of agglutination
used in blood tests. The blood groups
among hemophiliacs have the same uni-
formity in behavior as normal individ-
uals. Further, the laws of inheritance
are the same regardless of race, hybrid-
ity, etc.
Addressing himself to the point
raised by the court that Newton's The-
ory was invalidated by Einstein's The-
ory, Dr. Wiener points out that this is
is Wiener, A. S., "The Judicial Weight of
Blood Grouping Test Results," J. Criminal L.
not so in everyday life. "Einstein's
Theory," says Dr. Wiener, "becomes
important when dealing with velocities
approaching in magnitude that of the
velocity of light-180,000 miles a sec-
ond. Ordinarily, however, we deal with
velocities not exceeding 500 miles per
hour, and fo" such speeds Newton's
laws of motion are certainly accurate
enough."
The Holod case was critically com-
mented upon in an article in the Iowa
Law Review which concluded as fol-
lows: "The uncontradicted testimony
of the expert negativing paternity
should be final. If it is doubted, other
experts could take new tests until the
facts of the blood content could be
shown with accuracy. 'Then, when this
was established but one result would
be scientifically possible, and for a
court to hold to the contrary seems an
absurdity." This, it seems, should be
the court's attitude and procedure, if
it is striving solely for justice. The
court should not convict, when the
blood test exonerates; but it is equally
the court's duty to verify that the test
has been properly conducted by com-
petent physicians. Once that is done,
the court's duty is plain. Any decision
contrary to such scientific findings
should not be considered real justice.
From March 22, 1935, to December
31, 1940, 549 blood tests have been per-
,formed in the City of New York pur-
suant to orders of the Courts of Spe-
cial Sessions and Domestic Relations.
Of this number 52 resulted in abso-
lute exclusions of paternity-nearly 10
and Crin (Pol. Science See.) 31 (4), Nov.-
Dec. 523-525 (1940).
SIDNEY B. SCHATKIN
per cent. Inasmuch as today, with the
use of both the M-N and A-B tests,
one out of three false accusations can
be detected, the conclusion is apparent
that nearly 30 per cent of the accused
men who demand the test are not the
fathers of the children in question.
16
It is, of course, of vital importance
that a competent and qualified physi-
cian perform the test. Every safeguard
should be thrown around the test to
insure its proper performance. In the
case of each and every exclusion, it has
been the practice of the Corporation
Counsel's Office to have a repeat test
conducted by the same or another
equally qualified doctor. If there is the
slightest doubt about the result, even a
third test may be ordered. Every pos-
sible avenue of error, whether of tech-
nique or quality of sera used, is closed.
When all that has been done, and the
report still shows an absolute exclu-
sion of paternity, there can be no doubt
of the defendant's non-paternity.
With each exclusion of paternity that
has come to the writer's attention, he
has made it a practice to closely inter-
16 Op. cit supra note 1 at p. 260.
rogate the complainant. It is a note-
worthy commentary on the utter accu-
racy of the blood test result that almost
invariably the complainant admits, for
the first time, sexual relations with
another man about the time she became
pregnant.
In the light of these facts, any ob-
struction put in the path of the tests
is an obstruction of justice. Nor should
the courts be over-technical in their
interpretation of legislative enactments
designed for the exclusive purpose of
aiding in the administration of true jus-
tice. For centuries cases of disputed
parentage have perplexed both courts
and legislatures. Not until the advent
of scientific blood tests has there been
any substantial aid to the courts in
solving this perplexing issue. Science
has made a noteworthy contribution to
the law of our time, and the courts
should hesitate before lightly casting
this gift aside.
In the writer's opinion, it is only a
question of time before the value of
this scientific evidence becomes appar-
ent to the legislatures of all forty-eight
states. The forward march of truth
cannot be stopped!
